We show that the effect of taxes on dividends depends strongly on whether dividends are used to address agency conflicts. The average payout ratio after a large dividend tax increase falls by 30 percentage points when potential agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are low, but only by 18 percentage points when potential conflicts are high. Highconflict firms also more often become indirectly owned through tax-exempt holding companies.
Introduction
The effect of income taxes on dividends continues to be an open question. While some claim that taxes have a first-order negative effect on dividends (Poterba 2004 , Chetty and Saez 2005 , 2006 , 2010 , others argue the effect is only minor (Hubbard and Michaely 1997 , Brav et al. 2008 , Yagan 2014 . We hypothesize that these conflicting results arise because dividend decisions are also determined by concerns for agency costs, which moderate the effect of taxes.
Specifically, lower dividends do not just reduce taxes, but may also increase agency costs (Bhattacharya 1979 , Rozeff 1982 , Jensen 1986 , Denis 2009 . Therefore, when dividend taxes are increased, firms with serious agency problems may be reluctant to cut payout despite the potential tax savings.
We study the causal effect of taxes on dividends by exploiting a regulatory shock in Norway in 2006 that increased the dividend tax rate for individuals from 0% to 28%. We choose this setting for three reasons. First, because the tax shock is large, any change in dividend policy around the time of the tax reform is likely to be driven by taxes. Second, because the tax rate in Norway is flat both before and after the reform, we avoid complications due to multiple tax brackets. Third, dividends and capital gains in Norway are taxed identically, and share repurchases are negligible. 1 We can thus focus on cash dividends only.
Our main contribution is to show how the impact of taxes on dividends depends on the severity of agency costs. One common source of agency costs is the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976). We focus instead on the less analyzed conflict between majority and minority shareholders, which may be particularly important for dividend policy (La Porta et al. 2000) . Accordingly, we choose a sample where this potential shareholder conflict is especially serious. We select firms where one shareholder owns more than 50% of the shares, producing a sample of firms with a controlling owner that represent around 70% of aggregate sales, assets or earnings in the economy, and that spans a wide range of firm characteristics, including size. A controlling stake gives the owner strong incentives to monitor management and mitigate the standard manager-shareholder conflict, sufficient power to single-handedly make the dividend decision, and the opportunity to extract private benefits and expropriate minority shareholders.
Having chosen a sample where the firm's controlling shareholder can both expropriate minority shareholders and determine the dividends, we exploit the cross-sectional variation in her incentives to expropriate, which depends on the size of her controlling equity stake. The smaller the controlling stake (i.e., the closer to 50%), the lower her loss of firm value caused by her consumption of private benefits. Thus, the incentive to expropriate the minority and hence the potential agency conflict is larger the smaller the controlling stake. Paying a larger dividend reduces this agency conflict, but may also increase the tax cost. Accordingly, the controlling shareholder faces a tradeoff between the agency benefit and the tax cost of dividends. The agency benefit declines with the controlling stake, while the tax cost is constant.
We first show that the tax shock had a large effect on dividends, reducing the average dividend payout ratio (dividends to earnings) from 43% to 18%. Our main result is to show that the dividend drop is smaller the higher the potential shareholder conflict. For instance, the average payout ratio falls by 30 percentage points in firms where the majority shareholder's stake is high (90-99%; low conflict)), but falls only by 18 percentage points where the stake is low (50-60%; high conflict). Similarly, multiple-owner firms are more reluctant to cut dividends after the tax increase than are single-owner firms, which have no minority shareholder and hence no shareholder conflict whatsoever. Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of taxes on dividends depends on the severity of agency costs, because shareholders trade off the tax effect against the agency effect.
Given the importance of addressing agency costs, and thus the desire to maintain dividends even after a tax increase, we hypothesize that firms with severe agency problems look for ways to mitigate the increased tax burden that dividends impose. While the tax shock increases the tax on dividends paid to individuals, dividends paid to firms are tax-free. Hence, we predict that high-conflict firms will more often be indirectly owned through holding company structures. Although paying dividends to a holding company does not reduce tax payments if the dividends are needed for consumption, such indirect ownership ensures that the cash is taken away from the company insiders without triggering an immediate tax payment.
We show that the number of holding companies quadruples after the tax reform, and that the ratio of holding companies to all companies grows from 2% to 12%. Difference-in-difference tests across four Nordic countries confirm that this sharp growth in indirect ownership is unique to Norway.
2 Using a switching model to account for the choice of direct vs. indirect ownership, we find that firms with higher potential shareholder conflicts are particularly likely to be indirectly owned.
Overall, both the regulatory shock and the sample characteristics increase our ability to identify the relationship between dividends, taxes, and agency costs. Our results suggest that the firm's dividend policy depends on the tradeoff between one important cost of dividends (tax cost, which depends on whether ownership is direct or indirect) and one important benefit (reduced agency costs, which depends on the controlling shareholder's equity stake). To illustrate, the average dividend decrease in our sample firms is largest at 31 percentage points when the tax cost is high (direct ownership) and the agency benefit is low (high controlling stake). In contrast, the average dividend decrease is smallest at 16 percentage points when the tax cost is low (indirect ownership) and the agency benefit is high (low controlling stake). This difference is significant both statistically and economically. The dividend decrease is between these two extremes when the tax cost and the agency benefit are either both high (21 percentage points) or both low (26 percentage points).
Our data set is rich and accurate. We analyze a large sample of firms over thirteen years.
The governance data include the ownership structure of every firm in the economy and all family relationships between owners, directors, and CEOs. These detailed ownership data allow us to identify majority shareholders and to analyze a clearly identified agency conflict. Also, the law mandates a standardized set of publicly audited accounting statements for all firms. The court will liquidate the firm if the accounting data are not submitted to a public register within 17 months after fiscal-year end. Almost all the filtered firms are private.
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Our findings extend the dividend literature on taxes, on agency costs, and on private firms in several ways. Regarding taxes, we find strong evidence that taxes do matter for dividends, while avoiding three problems in the existing literature. First, studies of tax effects on dividends ignore the effect of agency conflicts. We show that the agency effect is strong, and that ignoring it can bias the estimates of the tax elasticity of dividends. Second, the identification of tax effects is often complicated by dividend tax clienteles, as investors in different tax brackets pay different taxes on their dividend income (Elton and Gruber 1970, holding company can be used to store the cash that is paid out from the operating company, thereby moving the cash away from the control of the insiders. Also, because 71% of the holding companies in our sample own shares in just one operating company, most holding companies cannot be used to reallocate capital across operating companies. Finally, as holding companies have no operating activity, and because 79% of them have just one owner, agency problems in the holding company are negligible. Just as for any other company, setting up a holding company is not free. As detailed below, there are reporting costs, auditing costs, and minimal equity requirements. 3 The almost exclusively private character of our sample is the result of the requirement that one owner has more than half of the equity, which is rare in Norwegian public firms.
Desai and Jin 2011). In contrast, the tax rate in our sample is flat and identical for dividends and capital gains This means the tax shock changed the tax cost of dividends identically across all taxable investors, while the potential agency cost remained unchanged. Third, most tax reforms examined in the literature changed not just the dividend tax, but also the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains, such as the 1986 and 2003 reforms in the United States (Hubbard and Michaely 1997, Chetty and Saez 2005) . These tax reforms may influence both the overall payout and the choice of payout type. In contrast, the tax reform we study was designed to affect dividends and capital gains equally (Sørensen 2005) . Because the tax change is neutral across payout types, the dividend response cannot be driven by tax-induced shifts between dividends and repurchases. This neutrality also rules out the possibility that dividends are used as a credible signal of intrinsic value (Bernheim 1991, Bernheim and Wantz 1995) .
Finally, we find no indication that shareholders pay themselves larger salaries to offset smaller dividends after the dividend tax increased (Alstadsaeter et al. 2015) .
The second contribution to the literature is to clarify whether dividend policy is used to increase or decrease agency costs. La Porta et al. (2000) compare dividend policy across legal regimes and find that firms pay higher dividends in countries with stronger legal regimes, where the potential to exploit minority shareholders is less, and thus the need to pay dividends to mitigate agency conflicts is also less. They interpret their results as supporting the "outcome" hypothesis where a strong legal regime forces firms to pay high dividends. Our results instead support the "substitute" hypothesis, suggesting that majority shareholders voluntarily choose high payout to mitigate conflicts with minority shareholders rather than choose low payout to opportunistically exploit them. be costly because it increases the cost of taking the cash outside the reach of insiders. In contrast, the system of tax-free intercorporate dividends used in Norway and many other countries enables shareholders to organize their ownership in ways that reduce the cost of trading off tax effects and agency effects.
The Norwegian setting is particularly well suited for these tests. First, our results indicate that the potential for agency conflicts has important effects on payout also when minority investors are well protected by the law (La Porta et al. 2000 , Dyck and Zingales 2004 , Spamann 2010 . We provide strong evidence that while good regulatory protection may be necessary, is not sufficient. We find that market-based mechanisms such as dividend policy are used to build reputation and thereby reduce agency conflicts. Second, our rich dataset covering the population of limited liability firms allows for a comprehensive test of the controlling shareholder's behavior. We can select the firms where the main agency problem is the shareholder conflict rather than the shareholder-manager conflict, we can measure the intensity of this conflict, and we can analyze how this conflict intensity interacts with taxes through the effect on dividends. Our results shed light on the main agency problem for most firms in any economy, which is underresearched in the dividend literature. Third, the large tax shock we study provides a clean identification channel: The tax cost of dividends is uniformly increased for all personal investors, while the intensity of the agency problem remains stable over time, but varies from firm to firm. Fourth, while changes in dividend taxation are not unusual across the world, it is unusual to have a large, identical tax change for both dividends and capital gains, and where these two tax rates are identical for any investor both before and after the tax change.
The next section describes the regulatory setting. Section 3 specifies the hypotheses and models, while Section 4 presents the sampling procedure. Section 5 explores the dynamics of dividend payout around the tax reform, Section 6 examines how indirect ownership influences the tradeoff between tax effects and agency effects, and Section 7 considers an alternative explanation of our main result. We summarize and conclude in Section 8.
Regulation
The Norwegian tax reform we examine increased the cost of paying dividends to individuals and aligned the tax rates on dividends, capital gains, interest, and labor. 4 The tax system changed such that it resembles systems used in many other countries, where individuals but not firms pay dividend taxes. introduced a 28% personal tax on dividend income and capital gains in excess of a threshold amount based on riskless returns 6 . Under the previous tax regime, dividends were tax-exempt for any shareholder, while the tax for capital gains was almost always applied to a zero base and was hence equal to the dividend tax. In contrast, firms paid no taxes on dividends and capital gains before the reform, and pay no such taxes after it. During the transition period in 2005, personally held shares could be transferred to a holding company without triggering capital gains taxes.
The dividend is proposed by the board, and the dividend decision is made by majority vote in the shareholder meeting. The shareholders can decide to reduce the proposed dividend, but not to increase it. Dividends are paid to all shareholders in proportion to the percentage equity stake. Dividends can be paid out of the previous year's earnings and any retained 4 The main purpose of the tax reform was to decrease the difference in tax rates between labor income and investment income. This difference was 36.7 percentage points in the highest tax bracket for labor income before the tax reform. The reform decreased the top marginal tax on labor income from 64.7% to 54.3%, while the sum of taxes paid by the firm and the investor on dividends and capital gains increased from 28% to 48.2%. The system of tax-free intercorporate dividends and capital gains was maintained to ensure that the tax on investment income would not exceed the tax on labor income. Source: www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/. 5 The major exception is the United States, where intercorporate dividends are taxed, albeit at a discounted rate. Because institutions pay no dividend tax in that regime, institutions might have a role similar to that of holding companies in our sample. However, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) do not find that higher institutional ownership is associated with higher payout. One possible reason is that institutions rarely own majority stakes. 6 The risk-free deduction is applied uniformly for all individual investors at a rate set by the Ministry of Finance.
earnings from earlier years. The dividend decision is typically made two months after the fiscal year's end, and the payment happens two weeks afterwards.
Hypotheses and models
We examine the impact of the tax shock on the average firm's dividend policy, the variation in this impact across firms with different potential for agency conflicts, and the role of indirect ownership in protecting the beneficial agency effect of dividends against the costly tax effect.
A key question in these agency settings is whether shareholders use dividends to reduce or increase agency conflicts. There are two mutually exclusive theories (LaPorta et al. 2000 , Cheffins 2006 . Dividends are used to reduce agency conflicts in the substitute theory, which reflects minority-friendly behavior. A larger conflict potential as reflected in the ownership structure is associated with higher payout. The opposite behavior is assumed in the outcome theory, where majority shareholders opportunistically exploit minority shareholders by paying lower dividends the larger the potential conflict. We specify the agency-related hypotheses only under the substitute theory, as the outcome theory always predicts the opposite.
The first hypothesis predicts that dividends will decrease in all firms after the dividend tax increase (H1). We test H1 by comparing the average firm's payout ratio and payout propensity before vs. after the tax reform. We also run regressions where we control for the usual dividend determinants, such as firm size, age, risk, growth opportunities, and industry.
Our second hypothesis predicts that the fall in dividends after the tax reform will be smaller the more dividends can reduce shareholder conflicts (H2). Hence, payout will fall, but firms with higher conflict potential will be more willing to continue paying. H2 implies that among the firms with a controlling owner, the dividend decrease will be smaller in multipleowner firms than in single-owner firms, since the latter have no shareholder conflicts. Also, the decrease will be smaller in multiple-owner firms where the controlling stake is low (closer to 50%) rather than high (closer to 100%). This is because the controlling shareholder of the lowconcentration firm is more tempted to choose private benefits over dividends, as almost half the private benefits are financed by minority shareholders. In contrast, the controlling shareholder of the high-concentration firm receives most of the dividends and therefore internalizes most of the cost of private benefits. Using these alternative samples, we first test H2 with univariate models for the paired difference in payout ratio and payout propensity before vs. after the tax reform.
The second test of H2 uses multivariate models that examine the effect on dividends coming from taxes, potential agency conflicts, the interaction between the two, and control Fama and French (2001) show that dividends relate significantly to size, which we measure by the log of revenues in millions of NOK. We measure age by the log of the number of years since the firm was founded as of 2005. Growth is measured by sales to assets, using the logic that a higher ratio reflects lower slack, higher investment needs, and hence lower dividends.
Risk is measured by the volatility of sales growth over the last three (minimum) to seven (maximum) years. Dividends have been shown to be inversely associated with risk (Grullon et al. 2002) . Finally, we include the Number of owners and its interaction with the after-tax-reform dummy to account for possible coordination problems among shareholders that may reduce the elasticity of dividends to taxes (Alstadsaeter et al. 2015) . Our baseline model is: Growth Risk β β ε
The dependent variable is the payout ratio D, which we calculate as cash dividends to operating earnings. 8 We first estimate (1) on the population of all firms regardless of ownership structure. 7 We define the first two agency measures using the ownership structure before the tax reform. For instance, a single-owner firm in our sample has just one shareholder before the tax shock. As we show in Table 1 , however, ownership is very stable over time. Therefore, not surprisingly, the regression results are very similar if we use contemporaneous ownership measures (results are available upon request). Since the free cash flow is much less stable, we use contemporaneous values for this variable. 8 One worry about this payout measure is that the controlling owner may manipulate reported earnings (La Porta et al. 2000) . Therefore, we alternatively measure payout in Table A .1 of the Appendix as dividends to sales,
In this version of (1) we ignore the ownership variable, predicting β1 < 0, β4 > 0, β5 < 0, β6 < 0, and β7 > 0. We predict β5 < 0 because the tax cost of paying out free cash flow is higher after the tax increase. Similarly, we expect β7 > 0 because the need to coordinate more owners may make it harder to reduce dividends after the tax increase. For the control variables, we predict β8 > 0, β9 > 0, β10 < 0, and β11 < 0. Since we have several observations for each firm, we cluster standard errors at the firm level. We use industry dummies in all specifications. To control for further unobserved time and cross-sectional effects we include year fixed effects and also look at the change in payout within each firm as described below.
When using the subsample of firms with controlling shareholders, we measure
Ownership in (1) by the dummy variable Single-owner firm, which we also interact with After tax reform. We expect a negative coefficient for the interaction term, as single-owner firms have no shareholder conflict and are more likely to cut dividends when the dividend tax increases. Narrowing the sample further to multiple-owner firms with a controlling shareholder and either high or low ownership concentration, we measure Ownership as High-concentration firm (the majority shareholder's equity stake is 90-99% as opposed to 50-60%), and we also interact it with After tax reform. We expect a negative coefficient for the interaction term, as high-concentration firms have lower potential agency conflicts and hence find it less costly to reduce dividends in order to save taxes for their owners.
As a simpler alternative, we estimate a model where the dependent variable is the average payout ratio after ( The tax reform introduced taxes on personal dividends, but not on intercorporate dividends. H3 predicts that this event increases the use of indirect ownership in order to reduce the tax cost of dividends. We test H3 by analyzing whether indirect ownership is more common after the tax reform and whether this is a unique Norwegian phenomenon. Measuring indirect ownership as holding company ownership, we use t tests for the difference before vs. after in the proportion of holding companies and in the proportion of companies with a holding dividends to assets, and payout propensity. The results using these alternative measures correspond to what we report based on dividends to earnings here in the main text.
company owner. We use a difference-in-difference approach to compare the prevalence of holding companies in Norway with the prevalence of holding companies in the neighboring countries Denmark, Finland, and Sweden before and after the Norwegian tax reform.
H4 predicts that a move from direct to indirect ownership is more likely in firms with higher potential for agency conflicts, which will also pay higher dividends. Indirect ownership cannot be used to avoid dividend taxes if the dividend is needed to finance consumption. If dividends are used to reduce agency costs, however, indirect ownership allows for a tax-free payout of free cash flow that would otherwise be at the majority shareholder's discretion inside the firm. The higher tax on dividends paid by individuals may therefore produce a positive link between conflict potential and indirect ownership.
Given H2, we also expect firms with indirect ownership to pay higher dividends, and that these dividends decrease less after the tax shock. We test H4 by first extending the univariate tests used for H1, looking separately at firms with and without indirect ownership.
We expect that indirectly owned firms decrease payout less after the tax increase, and that the decrease is smaller the larger the conflict potential.
The second test of H4 accounts for the possibility that if firms with higher conflict potential intend to have higher payout, they may self-select into indirect ownership to reduce the tax costs. This means the tax cost will differ across our sample according to conflict severity.
To capture this relationship, we estimate an endogenous switching model consisting of a selection equation and a dividend equation (Maddala 1983 , Song 2004 , Li and Prabhala 2007 
IOit = 1 if the firm has indirect owners and 0 otherwise. Firms will presumably be indirectly owned if the benefit of this organizational form exceeds the cost. Indirect ownership through a holding company should be more likely after the tax reform due to the dividend tax argument.
An additional benefit of owning indirectly is lower costs of managing multiple investments.
We measure Number of investments as the highest number of firms any of the shareholders invests in. One cost of indirect ownership is caused by the fact that establishing a holding company requires at least NOK 100,000 of equity. 9 Therefore, setting up a holding company will be worthwhile only if the capital invested in the operating company is large enough. We account for this cost by Large equity base, which equals 1 if the book value of the operating company's equity is NOK 100,000 or more. These two variables, which are our instruments for indirect ownership, satisfy the relevance condition. Regarding the exclusion condition, establishing a holding company before the tax reform is unlikely to be dividend-tax related, since there is no tax benefit. Moreover, having book value of equity above or below NOK 100,000 should not directly influence the payout ratio. Finally, we add the control variables from (1).
We estimate the dividend equation of the switching model separately for the two organizational forms, which we denote 0 for direct ownership and 1 for indirect ownership, 
The error terms of (4) and (5) are assumed to be possibly correlated with the error term of (3), as companies can self-select into one of the groups. We make the standard assumption that the three error terms have a trivariate normal distribution.
This switching model allows us to measure the change in payout after the tax reform in (4) and (5) while controlling for possible self-selection into indirect ownership from (3).
Moreover, (3) estimates the characteristics of firms that are more likely to be indirectly owned.
We also estimate a switching model based on the change specification in (2). The selection equation is:
the cost by a wide margin. Establishing a holding company requires equity of NOK 100,000. The holding company's assets are the shares transferred from the individual's personal account to the holding company. The registration and auditing fees are tax deductible at 28%. Source: www.smbinfo.no. 
The error term of the selection equation in (6) can be correlated with the error terms of the dividend equations in (7) and (8). We assume the error terms are trivariate normal.
Data
The data set covers the period 2000-2012. 10 We include several years on both sides of the 2006 tax reform in order to capture permanent shifts in dividend policy rather than just one-off temporary effects. We apply several filters to build the sample of economically active firms from the population of all limited liability firms:
1. We exclude financial firms in order to avoid the impact of peculiar capital requirements and accounting rules.
2. To avoid inactive firms, we require positive sales, assets, and employment.
3. We exclude business groups and subsidiaries unless controlled by a holding company.
Dividends in business groups can be distorted by a special Norwegian tax treatment of cash transfers between group members 11 4. We ignore the smallest 5% of firms by assets, sales, and employment.
These filters imply that our initial sample contains all active non-financial public and private firms. We use this sample to give a broad picture of the aggregate change in dividends and indirect ownership around the time of the tax reform. We add an additional filter to construct the main sample of firms with potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. Firms in this sample must have a controlling shareholder, which means more than half the equity is owned by a family or by a firm whose ultimate owners cannot be identified.
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We use the resulting sample to study how the tax reform influences the tradeoff between tax effects and agency effects. Because the data set includes all firms in the economy, our ownership measures reflect ultimate ownership rather than just direct ownership. The ownership filter leaves us with a main sample representing around 70% of aggregate sales, assets, and earnings in the economy. The number of firms in our sample that are larger than the median listed firm is 15 times the total number of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
We keep majority control constant across the firms in the main sample while exploiting the variation in ownership concentration, which reflects how cash-flow rights are split between majority and minority owners. The majority owner can determine total payout single-handedly, but the proportion of it he or she receives depends on the size of the majority stake. The potential conflict between shareholders and management is minimal, as the controlling shareholder owns 71% of the equity on average, which provides the power to hire and fire managers as well as strong incentives to monitor them. The controlling shareholder is a family in 95% of the cases, is on the board in 68% and holds the CEO position in 52%. Only about four percent of the equity is owned by foreigners.
We exclude firms without majority control in the main sample in order to reduce complexity and increase power. Increasing the largest shareholder's equity share in a nonmajority firm has ambiguous effects on agency costs. A larger share may decrease conflicts between shareholders and management (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) , but may increase conflicts between shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Moreover, complex owner coalitions may be 11 Pyramiding is rare in Norway, as 79% of the holding companies have just one owner after the tax reform, while 8% have two owners. The pre-reform proportions were 43% and 17%, respectively. Building control through more than one level of pyramiding occurs in 0.52% of the operating companies after the tax reform and 0.18% before. 12 We define a family as a group related by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. We cannot identify the ultimate owners of financial institutions, foreign personal investors, and foreign corporate investors. We measure indirect ownership as holding company ownership. A holding company must have the relevant industry code or a ratio of sales to assets below 5%, reflecting minor economic activity beyond owning financial assets. This filter ensures that holding companies mainly manage their owners' investments in operating companies. Holding companies enter our samples only as owning entities and never as owned. Table 1 reports initial tests of H1 and H2, comparing the mean payout ratio (Panel A) and the proportion of dividend payers (Panel B) before and after the tax reform in all firms (H1) and in subsamples of firms with different potential agency problems (H2).
The agency-related shift in dividend policy after the tax increase
13 Table 1 Considering first any firm regardless of its ownership structure (All firms), the mean payout ratio in Panel A declines from 43% before the tax reform to 18% after. The proportion of dividend payers in Panel B declines from 41% to 23%. Consistent with H1, this shift in payout policy is strongly significant both statistically and economically. In the debate about the importance of taxes for dividends, our results therefore support the argument of a strong effect (Poterba 2004 , Chetty and Saez 2005 , 2006 , 2010 . The large payout change in our sample of private firms is also in line with the idea that dividend smoothing is not an important concern in such firms (Michaely and Roberts 2012).
A similar shift happens in the subsample of firms with a controlling owner, which is the relevant sample for H2. These firms pay dividends slightly above the overall average before the 13 The year refers to the accounting year the dividends are based on. tax increase, and very close to the overall average afterwards. Splitting this sample into singleowner firms (no shareholder conflict) and multiple-owner firms (potential shareholder conflict), however, both the payout ratio and the payout propensity decrease by less in multiple-owner firms. However, the decrease remains both economically and statistically significant. For instance, average payout decreases by 30 percentage points in single-owner firms and by 27 in multiple-owner firms. The p-values for the difference in means in the rightmost column show that both the dividend propensity and the payout ratio decrease less in multiple-owner firms.
We next compare the dividend response in low-concentration firms (large conflict potential) and high-concentration firms (small conflict potential), using the sample of multipleowner firms with a majority owner. Both payout measures fall much less in low-concentration firms, which also maintain higher payout after the tax reform. For instance, the average payout ratio decreases by 30 percentage points in high-concentration firms and by just 18 in lowconcentration firms. The rightmost column shows that the difference is highly significant.
Every shift in dividend policy around the tax reform in panels A and B is consistent with the tradeoff logic of H2. That is, dividends react less and remain higher after the dividend tax increase the more serious the potential shareholder conflict. However, these dividend shifts may also be driven by shifts in other dividend determinants than taxes and the rough classification of conflict potential. Panel C presents test results for the difference in after vs. before tax-reform value for ownership concentration, free cash flow, the number of owners, and key control variables in our main sample of multiple-owner firms with a controlling owner.
The results show that compared to the situation before the tax reform, the average postreform firm has the same ownership concentration and free cash flow. Hence, the potential seriousness of the shareholder conflict is typically unaffected by the tax reform. However, the average post-reform firm has more shareholders, larger size, less growth, and less risk. These shifts suggest that we should account carefully for a wider set of determinants than those in panels A and B when studying how dividends, taxes, and shareholder conflicts interact. This is the approach taken in Table 2 , where we test H2 by relating the firm's payout ratio to the tax shock, measures of agency costs, and control variables. To better understand the dividend impact of the shareholder conflict, we alternatively estimate the model for all firms, all firms with a controlling owner, and multiple-owner firms with a controlling owner. Table 2 Panel A presents the results of estimating model (1) using the payout ratio for each of the years before (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and after (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) the dividend tax increase. This approach also allows us to return to H1 in a regression setting: The strongly negative coefficient for the post-reform dummy in all three samples confirms the large decrease in payout even when we account for the heterogeneity of firm characteristics.
We continue testing H2 by examining the subsample of firms with a controlling owner.
Single-owner firms (no shareholder conflict) experience a larger decrease than multiple-owner firms, the interaction term being -0.0463. Multiple-owner firms with high ownership concentration (low shareholder conflict) reduce their payout more than do low-concentration firms, as the interaction term is -0.0792. Controlling for firm characteristics, the expected decrease in the payout ratio is eight percentage points smaller for firms with large potential agency conflicts. This difference is economically large, considering that the average decrease is 25 percentage points and that the post-reform average payout ratio is 18%. A higher free cash flow is associated with higher dividends in all three samples, although the association is weaker after the tax increase in firms with a controlling owner.
As expected from the coordination argument, a larger number of shareholders reduces both the dividend level and the elasticity of dividends to the tax increase. Finally, the control variables are associated with dividends as predicted: Larger, older firms with fewer growth opportunities and lower risk pay higher dividends.
Panel B presents the estimates of model (2), where the dependent variable is the change in dividends. We once more find that single-owner firms pay less after the tax increase than do multiple-owner firms, and that high-concentration firms with multiple owners reduce payout more than low-concentration firms do. Increased free cash flow is associated with higher dividends after the reform. Having more owners reduces the decrease in payout, although the result is rather weak. Increased size and decreased risk are associated with higher dividends.
14 Altogether, the results in this section support the predictions of H1 and H2 that although dividends are strongly sensitive to taxes for firms as a whole, this sensitivity varies considerably from firm to firm because the tax effect of dividends is traded off against the agency effect, which is not homogenous across firms.
14 The Appendix shows further robustness results. To reduce the possible effect on standard errors of serially correlated variables (Bertrand et al. 2004 ), we estimate model (1) in Panel A of Table A .2 by collapsing the annual values for each variable into one average value for the variable in the pre-reform period and one in the post-reform period. We estimate (1) with annual year dummies rather than the before/after tax reform dummy in Panel B, while Panel C runs regressions separately for the years before and the years after the tax reform. The results in Panels A-C correspond to those in Table 2 .
Trading off tax costs and agency costs under indirect ownership
This section explores whether the choice of organizational form is used to more cheaply trade off tax effects and agency effects in dividend policy. Specifically, we analyze whether the regulatory shift towards a higher dividend tax for individuals than for corporations makes shareholders switch from direct to indirect ownership (H3) and maintain high payout, particularly when potential shareholder conflicts are large (H4). Such a mechanism would support the main result from Section 5 by suggesting that shareholders ensure free cash flow can be paid at minimum tax costs when the agency benefit of doing so is substantial.
Consistent with H3, Table 3 in 2012 (column 6). Table 3 Table 3 also shows that holding companies are increasingly set up by just one investor to own shares in just one operating company. Table 4 Table 4 shows that a tax reform that allowed for tax-free dividends to firms but not to individuals produces a large, new layer of tax-free intermediaries between operating firms and their ultimate, taxable owners. This evidence is consistent with H3.
We use this new layer of indirect ownership to better understand how firms with different agency costs respond differently to the tax shock. H4 predicts that owning indirectly rather than directly is associated with higher payout after the tax reform, and that this difference is larger the more serious the conflict potential. As predicted, the univariate results in Table 5 show that payout does indeed decrease less with indirect ownership except in single-owner firms, where shareholder conflicts cannot exist. Table 5 In the sample of indirectly owned firms, which have the lower tax costs after the reform, low-concentration firms (high conflict potential) reduce their payout by fewer percentage points than do high-concentration firms (low conflict potential), the numbers being 16 and 25, respectively. The difference in payout response is significant at the 1% level. Among directly owned firms, the difference is 12 percentage points, which again is significant at the 1% level.
These results are consistent with the findings for H2 in Section 5.
The measurement of the agency effect in our test for H2 may be affected by firms with higher payout propensity that actively manage tax costs by self-selecting into indirect ownership. We model this choice by using the switching model in (3)-(8). Panel A in Table 6 uses (4)-(5) as the dividend equation, while Panel B uses the alternative based on dividend changes in (7)-(8). Table 6 The estimated coefficients for the selection equation (3) The findings in Table 6 are consistent with H4. Moreover, they support the findings in Table 2 based on model (1), suggesting that the self-selection into indirect ownership does not affect our main result on the tradeoff between tax effects and agency effects. That is, firms with higher potential agency problems decrease their payout less even when we account for their self-selection into being indirectly owned.
Our results support the notion that the lack of an intercorporate dividend tax, which encourages the creation of holding companies, directly benefits shareholders by encouraging higher payout. We find that the average firm with a controlling owner would have had a predicted payout decrease of 42% with direct ownership and of 37% with indirect ownership.
In the subsample of firms with multiple owners, the numbers would have been 32% and 20%, respectively. This finding suggests a system of taxing intercorporate dividends as used in the United States may be costly because it increases the cost of using dividends to bring cash outside the reach of insiders.
Overall, this section has shown that indirect ownership is more common after the tax reform made dividend income taxable for individuals, but not for corporations. The more important result from our tradeoff perspective on taxes and agency costs is that the tendency to own indirectly and to maintain high dividends increases with the potential shareholder conflict.
This evidence supports the idea that dividends are used to reduce shareholder conflicts, and that indirect ownership is a tool for ensuring that the beneficial dividends carry minimum tax costs.
Dividends, labor income, and cash holdings
A major rationale for the tax reform was to reduce the gap between the taxation of capital income (dividends and capital gains) and labor income by increasing the tax on capital income for individuals (Sørensen 2005) . Therefore, one may argue that reduced dividend income will be compensated for by increased labor income, such that total payout is insensitive to the tax increase. This may be more likely in firms controlled by a family, which constitute 95% of our main sample. If this neutralizing payout of labor income does not occur, however, we expect total payout to decrease and the firm's cash holdings to increase.
We examine the evolution of payout to shareholders as labor income and dividends, as well as the firm's cash holdings. Panel A of Table 7 considers the labor income paid to shareholders by the firm in a given year. We normalize this labor income by the sum of the firm's earnings and the labor income paid to shareholders. This gross income reflects resources that can be paid to the owners, whether as dividend income or labor income. The figures show that the labor income either stays constant or decreases after the dividend tax increase, and that the effect is unrelated to potential shareholders conflicts. For instance, the average ratio of labor income to gross earnings is unchanged at 64% for firms with a controlling owner as a whole, and the change is not significantly different in low-vs. high-concentration firms. Hence, there is no evidence that increased labor income is used to offset reduced dividend income. Table 7 Panel B shows the average dividends paid from the firm to the shareholders per unit of gross income. The results are in line with those in Table 1 : The dividends decrease after the tax reform, and the decrease is smaller the higher the potential agency conflict.
The findings in panels A and B show that firms reduce their total cash payout to shareholders per unit of gross earnings after the dividend tax increase. This evidence suggests that the firm may have increased its cash reserves. This intuition is confirmed by Panel C, which shows the average, annual change in cash holdings per unit of gross earnings before and after the tax reform. The figures reflect that while the cash holdings decrease slightly before the tax reform, they increase afterwards.
All in all, we find little evidence of a switch from reduced dividends to increase labor income after the dividend tax increase. Instead, firms tend to accumulate cash. This evidence is consistent with our overall prediction that the tradeoff between tax effects and agency effects makes shareholders more willing to incur the tax cost of dividends the higher the agency benefit.
Summary and conclusion
The existing literature reports both first-order effects and minor effects of taxes on dividends.
Exploiting a large and clean regulatory shock to dividend taxation, we find that the effect is first-order. However, our major result is that the relationship between dividends and taxes is strongly moderated by the relationship between dividends and agency costs. We document that although the average dividends to earnings ratio decreases by 25 percentage points after the increased dividend tax, the decrease is considerably smaller when the potential shareholder conflict is large rather than small (18 compared to 30 percentage points).
This evidence suggests that although both taxes and agency costs are important for dividend policy, the two dividend determinants interact because costly tax effects of dividends are actively traded off against beneficial agency effects. This interpretation is strengthened by our finding that shareholders of firms with large potential shareholder conflicts tend to reduce the seriousness of this tradeoff by owning shares indirectly, thereby reducing the tax cost of dividends. Regime switching models suggest that these results are robust to allowing for the endogenous decision to optimize the tax cost through indirect ownership. Hence, investors seem to organize their ownership in ways that allow them to capture the agency benefit of dividends at the lowest possible tax cost.
We conclude that a key to understanding the role of taxes in dividend policy is to capture how shareholders trade off the tax effect against the agency effect. [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] and after (2006-2012) the tax reform. Panel A shows the mean payout ratio (cash dividends divided by operating earnings) and Panel B shows the payout propensity before and after the tax reform across six different samples. "All firms" include every private limited liability Norwegian firm that is not a financial, not a holding company, and not part of a business group. "Firms with a controlling owner" have more than 50% ownership by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. "Single-owner firms" have only one shareholder, while "Multiple-owner firms" have at least two. "Low-concentration firms" are firms where the largest shareholder's stake is between 50% and 60%. "High-concentration firms" are firms where the largest shareholder's stake is between 90% and 99%. Panel C compares the mean values before and after the tax reform for select explanatory variables used in our regressions. The numbers in this panel refer to the sample of multiple-owner firms with a controlling shareholder, which is our main sample. "Ownership concentration" is the largest ultimate equity stake. "Free cash flow" is cash flow from operations divided by assets, "Size" is real sales in million 2005 NOK, "Age" is the number of years since the firm was founded as of 2005, "Growth" is sales over assets, and "Risk" is the standard deviation of sales growth over the last three (minimum) to seven (maximum) years. The payout ratio is winsorized at 0% and 95% values, while "Free cash flow", "Risk", "Growth", and "Size" are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. Table 2 The Sensitivity of Dividends to Taxes and Agency Conflicts
This table shows regressions results for model (1) in the main text, using the payout ratio (cash dividends divided by operating earnings) as the dependent variable. "All firms" derive from the population of private limited liability Norwegian firms and exclude financial firms, firms in business groups, and holding companies. "All firms with a controlling owner" are those among all firms that have more than 50% ownership by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. "Multi-owner firms with a controlling owner" are those among all firms with a controlling owner that have more than one shareholder. "After tax reform" is 1 if the observation is from 2000-2003 and 0 if the observation is from 2006-2012. "Single-owner firm" is 1 if the firm has just one shareholder and 0 otherwise. "High-concentration firm" is 1 if the largest ultimate equity stake is between 90% and 99% and 0 otherwise. "Free cash flow" is cash flow from operations divided by assets, "Number of owners" is the number of ultimate individual shareholders, "Size" is real sales in million 2005 NOK, "Age" is the log of the firm's age in years as of 2005, "Growth" is sales over assets, "Risk" is the standard deviation of sales growth over the last three (minimum) to seven (maximum) years. The payout ratio is winsorized at 0% and 95% values, while "Free cash flow", "Risk", "Growth", and "Size" are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. Panel A uses the payout ratio from years before and after the tax reform as the dependent variable, reporting results from pooled regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Panel B uses the difference between the average payout ratio after and before the tax reform as the dependent variable. We report the p -values in parentheses. Operating Companies and Holding Companies
This table presents aggregate statistics for the prevalence of operating companies and holding companies, and for how these companies are owned. An operating company is sampled from the population of private limited liability Norwegian companies and is not financial, nor part of a business group, but is a firm where more than 50% of the equity is owned by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. A holding company has some ownership stake in an operating company and has either a sales-to-assets ratio under 5% or uses the Statistics Norway sector code for a holding company. A holding company may have a parent, but the parent cannot be a subsidiary. Ownership is based on ultimate cash-flow rights. Except for the first column of results, we exclude single-owner operating companies. Columns (VI)-(X) present statistics from the pooled samples in the two subperiods. "All (.)" refers to the sample of all private limited liability companies and not just those with a controlling shareholder. We report the p-values (in parentheses) for the differences between the two subperiod averages in the last row. Table 5 Dividends, Potential Shareholder Conflicts, and Indirect Ownership
This table shows how the average payout ratio before and after the tax reform depends on whether the firm has potential agency problems and whether it has indirect ownership through holdings companies. We measure the payout ratio as cash dividends to operating earnings. "Before tax reform" is 2000 -2003 , and "After tax reform" is 2006 -2012 . A holding company is a firm with a stake in the operating company and either a sales-to-assets ratio under 5% or is classified by Statistics Norway as a holding company. We measure potential agency problems by ownership concentration as reflected in the largest ultimate equity stake. "All firms" include every private limited liability Norwegian firm that is not a financial, not a holding company, and not part of a business group. "Firms with a controlling owner" have more than 50% ownership by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. "Single-owner firms" have only one shareholder, while "Multiple-owner firms" have at least two. "Low-concentration firms" are firms where the largest shareholder's stake is between 50% and 60%. "High-concentration firms" are firms where the largest shareholder's stake is between 90% and 99%. An owner is a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. Table 6 The Relationship Between Dividends, Taxes, Agency Costs, and Indirect Ownership (3)- (5) in the main text, where operating companies may self-select into being owned by holding companies. Panel B uses the specification with the change in payout as the dependent variable as specified in (6)- (8). Every variable relates to an operating company, which is sampled from the population of private limited liability Norwegian firms that are not financials, not part of a business group, not a holding company, and have more than 50% ownership by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. The dependent variable in the selection equation is the dummy variable "Indirect ownership", which is 1 if the firm is directly owned and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the dividend equation is cash dividends to operating earnings. "Earlier indirect ownership" is a dummy variable that is 1 if the operating company had a holding company among its owners before the tax reform and 0 otherwise. "Number of investments" is the maximum number of equity investments a shareholder owns in 2005. "Large equity base" is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company's equity exceeds NOK 100,000 and 0 otherwise. A "Single-owner firm" has only one shareholder, while a "Multiple-owner firm has at least two. A "High-concentration firm" is where the largest shareholder's stake is between 90% and 99%. An owner is a family unit, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. "Free cash flow" is cash flow from operations divided by sales, "Number of owners" is the number of ultimate owners, "Size" is the log of real sales in million 2005 NOK, "Age" is the log of the company's age in 2005, "Growth" is sales over assets, and "Risk" is the standard deviation of sales growth over the last three (minimum) to seven ( Firms with direct ownership Change in payout ratio Change in payout ratio [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] and after (2006-2012) the tax reform. Panel A shows the mean ratio between the labor income received by the shareholders and the firm's gross earnings, which we calculate as after-tax operating earnings plus salaries paid to owners. Panel B shows the mean of dividend income received by the shareholders divided by the firm's gross earnings, while Panel C shows the mean change in the ratio of cash holdings to gross earnings in the firm. "Firms with a controlling owner" have more than 50% ownership by a family. "Single-owner firms" have only one shareholder, while "Multiple-owner firms" have at least two. "Low-concentration firms" are firms where the largest shareholder's stake is between 50% and 60%. "High-concentration firms" are firms where the largest shareholder's stake is between 90% and 99%. The sample is all majority-controlled private limited-liability Norwegian firms that are not financials, not part of business groups, not holding companies, but are owned more than 50% by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. The ratios in Panel A and B are winsorized at the 0% and 95% quantiles, while the ratios in Panel C are winsorized at 2.5% and 97.5%. We report p-values in parentheses.
Panel B: Dividend Income Table 7 Labor Income, Dividend Income, and Cash Holdings 
Robustness to Alternative Payout Measures
Panels A-C estimate the baseline model (1) of the main text, measuring the dependent variable as the dividend to sales ratio, the dividend to assets ratio, and the payout propensity, respectively. Payout propensity is 1 if the firm pays dividends that year and 0 otherwise. "All firms" is the population of private limited liability Norwegian firms that are not financials, not part of a business group, and not a holding firm. "All firms with a controlling owner" are those among all firms that have more than 50% ownership (controlling owner) by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. "Multi-owner firms with a controlling owner" are those among all firms with a controlling owner that have more than one shareholder. "After tax reform" is 1 in 2006-2012 and 0 otherwise. "Single-owner firm" is 1 if the firm has just one shareholder and 0 otherwise. "High-concentration firm" is 1 if the largest ultimate equity stake is between 90% and 99% and 0 otherwise. "Free cash flow" is cash flow from operations divided by assets, "Number of owners" is the number of ultimate individual shareholders in the firm, "Size" is real sales in million 2005 NOK, "Age" is the log of the firm's age in years in 2005, "Growth" is sales over assets, while "Risk" is the standard deviation of sales growth over the last three (minimum) to seven (maximum) years. The payout ratio is winsorized at 0% and 95% values, while "Free cash flow", "Risk", "Growth", and "Size" are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. We report results from pooled regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The p-values are shown in parentheses.
35,936
All firms with a controlling owner Table A.2 Panels A-C present regressions results for model (1) in the main text using alternative ways of accounting for the tax reform. The dependent variable is the payout ratio (cash dividends divided by operating earnings). Panel A collapses the pre and post tax reform values for each variable into one average value for the pre period and one for the post period. Panel B replaces the before/after tax reform dummy with individual year dummies. Panel C runs the regressions separately for the period before (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and after (2006-2012) the tax reform. "All firms" sample is derived from the population of private limited liability Norwegian firms and excludes financials, firms in business groups, and holding firms. "All firms with a controlling owner" are those among all firms that have more than 50% ownership by a family, a domestic institutional investor, or a foreign entity. "Multi-owner firms with a controlling owner" are those among All firms with a controlling owner that have more than one shareholder. "Single-owner firm" is 1 if the firm has just one shareholder and 0 otherwise. "High-concentration firm" is 1 if the largest ultimate equity stake is between 90% and 99% and 0 otherwise. "Free cash flow" is cash flow from operations divided by assets, "Number of owners" is the number of ultimate individual shareholders in the firm, "Size" is real sales in million 2005 NOK, "Age" is the log of the firm's age in years in 2005, "Growth" is sales over assets, while "Risk" is the standard deviation of sales growth over the last three (minimum) to seven (maximum) years. The payout ratio is winsorized at 0% and 95% values, while "Free cash flow", "Risk", "Growth", and "Size" are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% tails. We report results from pooled regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
